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Enforcement of International Law 
Obligations concerning Private Military 
Security Corporations 
PAULINE COLLINS* 
The responsibility of non-state entities for breaches of international law 
raises novel and difficult questions, and could… [give] rise to significant 
controversy.
1
 
Abstract 
This article considers the possibility of holding states responsible for 
wrongful acts committed by private military security corporations. The 
use of juridical entities in conflict zones present difficulties for 
accountability where they commit offences and breach international 
obligations. The Blackwater killings of Iraqi civilians in 2007 and the 
prospects of holding the corporate entity or the State accountable are 
utilised as a focal point for discussion. This article concludes that greater 
thought is required if victims are to be assured of genuine redress for 
wrongs. 
I INTRODUCTION 
States can be held responsible for the wrongful actions of corporate 
entities when those wrongful actions can be established to be an act of the 
state in accordance with secondary rules of attribution. Though state 
responsibility is determined through rules of customary international law, 
the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (‘DARS’) provide detail on the circumstances in which this 
can occur.
2
 Though the DARS do not represent binding treaty law, 
existing only as an annexure to General Assembly Resolution 56/83,
3
 they 
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1
 James Crawford, 'The ILC’s Articles On Responsibility Of States For Internationally 
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect' (2002) 96(4) American Journal Of International Law 874, 
888. 
2
 See, eg, International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of International Law Commission on the work of its 
Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56
th
 sess, UN Doc A/56/10 (24 October 2001), 26–143 
(‘DARS’).  
3
 The articles are annexed to GA Res. 56/83, (12 December 2001) commending the articles 
‘to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption 
 
nevertheless have considerable influence for the ongoing creation of 
customary international law. This is because the lengthy gestation period 
in developing the DARS has led to the articles being influential in 
international fora.
4
 A state breach of a primary international obligation
5
 
or dereliction of due diligence is required before state responsibility is 
triggered.
6
 Sometimes the exact nature of a primary international 
obligation imposed by a treaty may itself be ambiguous.
7
  
The existing obligation and attribution regime raises the question: when 
corporate entities operate transnationally, should they hold primary 
obligations for wrongs under international law, or is attribution of their 
wrongful conduct to the State a sufficient deterrent for the corporation 
and recompense for the victim? By focusing on a particular type of non-
state actor (‘NSA’), namely, private military and security corporations 
(‘PMSCs’) providing military and security forces for states in fragile 
environments, an examination of this issue is possible.
8
 The Montreux 
Document provides a working definition of PMSCs as:  
[P]rivate business entities that provide military and/or security services, 
irrespective of how they describe themselves.
9
  
Military and security services include, in particular: 
...armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as 
convoys, buildings and other places; maintenance and operation of 
                                                                                                                             
or other appropriate action.’ [3]. See generally, Daniel M Bodansky and John R Crook, 
'Symposium on the ILC's State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and Overview' (2002) 
96(4) American Journal of  International Law 773. 
4
 Crawford above n 1, 889. But cf David D Caron, 'The ILC Articles on State 
Responsiblity: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form and Authority' (2002) 96(4) 
American Journal of International Law 857, 867–869. 
5
 See, Ian Brownlie, Systems of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part 1 (Clarendon 
Press, 1983) 53–85, 66, for a list of primary obligations that could be breached, or ‘causes 
of action’.  
6
 DARS art 2(b).  Due diligence  exists  for states in regard to private individuals in 
international human rights law (IHRL), see the Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment No 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the 
Covenant, 80
th
 sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004), [8]. 
7
 See, for instance, in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ 
Rep43 (‘Genocide Judgment’) the ICJ judges varied in their approach to the obligation 
regarding genocide. 
8
 See, eg, Chia Lehnardt, 'Individual Liability of Private Military Personnel under 
International Criminal Law ' (2008) 19(5) European Journal of International Law 1015; 
Simon Chesterman, 'Oil And Water: Regulating The Behaviour Of Multinational 
Corporations Through Law' (2004) 36 International Law and Politics 307. 
9
 The Swiss Government and the ICRC, ‘Montreux Document on Pertinent International 
Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military 
and Security Companies during Armed Conflict’ (17 September 2008) (‘Montreux 
Document’) accepted by 42 states including the US, UK, EU, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local 
forces and security personnel.
10
  
The increasing use of PMSCs within the international order, particularly 
since the Afghanistan and latest Iraq wars, has prompted considerable 
attention in this area. The UN Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights set up the Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Private Military and Security 
Companies (‘IWG on PMSCs’) to consider the possibility of elaborating 
an international regulatory framework for the activities of PMSCs.
11
 The 
aim is to provide a draft UN Convention, to address the behaviour of both 
states and PMSCs.
12
 Alongside, and somewhat in the alternative, the 
Swiss International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) activated 
discussions with seventeen states that resulted in the 2008 Montreux 
Document 2008.
13
 This document restates existing pertinent hard law 
obligations, in treaty and custom, as well as soft law codes of practice as 
they relate to PMSCs.
14
 It does not engage with the theoretical or 
ideological questions surrounding the use of PMSCs, but rather 
pragmatically focuses on the obligations of contracting, territorial, and 
home states. Subsequently, in 2010, the Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces (‘DCAF’) produced an 
International Code of Conduct (‘ICoC’).
15
 The ICoC is a ‘soft law’ 
                                                          
10
 Ibid. 
11
 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Open-ended 
Intergovernmental Working Group to Consider the Possibility of Elaborating an 
International Regulatory Framework on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the 
Activities of Private Military and Security Companies, 22
nd
 sess, UN Doc A/HRC/22/L.29 
(18 March 2013), which established the IWG on PMSCs to consider the possibility of 
elaborating an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and 
oversight of the activities of private military and security companies. 
12
 ‘'Report of the Working Group on the use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination', 
65
th
 sess, UN Doc A/65/325 (UN General Assembly 25 August 2010) sets out a Draft 
Convention (‘Draft Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of PMSCs’). 
See also, J. Chris Haile, ‘New U.N. Draft International Convention On The Regulation, 
Oversight And Monitoring Of Private Military And Security Companies’ (2009) 6(9) 
International Government Contractor 69. 
13
 See, Montreux Document, above n 9.  
14
 Ibid; See further, James Cockayne, 'Regulating Private Military And Security 
Companies: The Content, Negotiation, Weaknesses And Promise Of The Montreux 
Document' (2008) 13(3) Journal of Conflict & Security Law at 401:‘[V]ariously described 
by its drafters as a ‘bible’, ‘compendium’, ‘toolkit’, ‘milestone’ and ‘stepping stone’, the 
Montreux Document provides the clearest statement to date of the legal norms and 
business, administrative and regulatory practices that shape the relationships between states 
and PMSCs.’ 
15
 The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers convened by 
the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Political Affairs, DCAF 
and Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 2012: The 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (‘ICoC’), provides guidelines the 
 
document for observance by industry members that agreed to accept 
responsibility for their conduct in areas such as basic human rights, use of 
force and detention practices. This code provides for the establishment of 
an oversight body as agreed to by all interested parties.
16
 The latter two 
instruments may well complement any legal convention that is yet to 
evolve.
17
  
The IWG on PMSCs and the ICRC approach this issue from very 
different ideological perspectives. White points out the IWG consider 
PMSCs from the classical position of the desire of the international 
community to control the use of force.
18
 The ICRC, operating from a 
position of discretion, does not seek to comment on this aspect. Rather, it 
accepts the use of PMSCs as part of the new landscape in which market 
forces and the contractual state has seen PMSCs as a useful addition to 
their arsenal.
19
 Therefore, states that have supported this evolving 
industry (such as the UK and US) tend to favour the soft regulation 
approach established under the ICRC initiatives. 
Self-regulation has been preferred by PMSCs, with a number adopting 
this approach.
20
 However, other than market deterrence through public 
loss of credibility, soft law holds no direct coercive enforcement 
capability.
21
 It does not engage international responsibility stricto sensu.  
Soft law does, however, signify emerging concerns of the international 
community. In that sense, soft law instruments can portend possibilities 
for future customary or treaty law developments.
22
 
The developments discussed have focus on the future and do not address 
the issues that have arisen in major conflicts such as Afghanistan and 
                                                                                                                             
effectiveness of which is dependent on the uptake and desire to enforce it. These guidelines 
are available at <www.icoc-psp.org>. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 See, Draft Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of PMSCs, UN Doc 
A/65/325. 
18
 Nigel D White, 'The Privatisation of Military and Security Functions and Human Rights: 
Comments on the UN Working Group's Draft Convention' (2011) 11(1) Human Rights 
Law Review 133, 134. 
19
 See also Stephanie M Hurst, '‘Trade In Force’: The Need For Effective Regulation Of 
Private Military And Security Companies' (2011) 84 Southern California Law Review 447. 
20
 ICoC, above n 15. See, eg, International Peace Operations Association 
<http://www.ipoaonline.org/> a US-based trade association of 53 PMSCs at April 2013 
who pledge to follow their Code of Conduct; British Association Of Private Security 
Companies <http://www.bapsc.org.uk>, a trade association of UK PMSCs providing 
security services internationally; Private Security Company Association Of Iraq (PSCAI) 
<http://www.pscai.org>, an industry-actor coordination mechanism formed by PMSCs in 
Iraq to fill a vacuum left by the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Private 
Security Company Working Group in June 2004. 
21
  See, eg, Cedric Ryngaert, 'Litigating Abuses Committed By Private Military Companies' 
(2008) 19(5) European Journal of International Law 1035, 1038–39. 
22
 Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed, 2005). 
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Iraq, where the consequences of the expanding use of PMSCs in areas 
such as combat defence have not been thought through or sufficiently 
debated in the public arena prior to their use.
23
 The International 
Commission of Jurists in its submission to the IWG on PMSCs in 2012 
concluded: 
[d]espite the level of progress through law and jurisprudence, 
international law does not provide for detailed rules to govern/regulate 
and guide State’s actions to regulate PMSCs so as to prevent violations, 
investigate alleged violations and provide remedy avenues when rights are 
violated.
24
 
In the broader context, numerous responses to the issues have occurred 
internationally.
25
 In 2002, the Bellagio Conference looked at financial 
resource flows to conflict zones in order to create an international regime 
that curtailed economic gain from conflict.
26
 Corporate regulation more 
widely has been raised by the Global Compact.
27
 Within the UN 
Framework, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ developed under John 
Ruggie’s mandate as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Business and Human Rights.
28
 The business community and 
states roundly rejected earlier attempts to impose direct international 
obligations on corporate entities, reinforcing the classic state-based 
                                                          
23
 For a discussion of the various roles and range of services provided by PMSCs, see E L 
Gaston, 'Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and Its 
Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement' (2008) 49(1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 221. 
24
 International Commission of Jurists submission to the IGWG on PMSCs, 13-17 August 
2012, 11. 
25
 See, Centre Universitaire de Droit International Humanitariare (CUDIH), 'Expert 
Meeting On Private Military Contractors: Status And State Responsibility For Their 
Actions' (University Centre For International Humanitarian Law, 29-30 August 2005) 
<http://www.adh-geneva.ch/docs/expert-
meetings/2005/2rapport_compagnies_privees.pdf> (‘Expert Meeting’); Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the House of Commons, 'Green Paper: Private Military Companies: Options 
for Regulation' (House of Commons, February 12 2002) (‘Green Paper’); UK Defence 
Select Committee’s sixth Report, 2005; James Cockayne et al, Beyond Market Forces 
Regulating the Global Security Industry (International Peace Institute, 2009); International 
Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 'Report of the ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate 
Complicity in International Crimes: Corporate Complicity & Legal Accountability' (2008) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a78423f2.html>; International Federation for 
Human Rights, Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Abuses - A Guide for Victims 
and NGOs on Recourse Mechanisms (2010) 
<http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/guide_entreprises_uk-intro.pdf>. 
26
 International Peace Academy, ‘Policies and Practices for Regulating Resource Flows to 
Armed Conflict’ (Paper Presented at IPA Conference, Bellagio, Italy, 21–23 May 2002). 
27
 UN Global Compact (2000) <www.unglobalcompact.org/>.  
28
 The Special Representative presented the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ framework to 
the Human Rights Council in June 2008 <http://www.business-
humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/Protect-Respect-Remedy-Framework>.  
approach to international law.
29
 Ruggie followed more closely the 
traditional approach of imposing obligations directly on states to regulate 
the corporate world, which has been generally accepted, with the 
subsequent development of Guiding Principles.
30
 
In all these developments, analysis has focused on where current 
international legal principles provide coverage and where they could 
improve. States are looked to for assurance that their primary obligations 
under international law are met by holding PMSCs accountable at the 
national level. The United States has argued at the IWG on PMSCs that 
‘[a] new international law on activities of private military and security 
companies was not needed, what was needed was the better 
implementation of existing norms’.
31
 While PMSCs may contend they 
are attempting to uphold standards by dismissing errant employees, this 
does not satisfy a demand for corporate observance of International 
Human Rights Law (‘IHRL’), International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) 
and International Criminal Law (‘ICL’). This article considers how the 
rules of attribution may engage state responsibility for breach of primary 
obligations to help achieve coverage of PMSC activity.  
The pace with which states have moved to establish a new international 
convention has been slow. This raises the question – why? Those states 
following the new marketised approach to governing, in which previously 
core government functions are devolved to private entities, no longer 
dwell on the established mechanisms designed to structurally protect the 
system by controlling the use of force through the state’s monopoly over 
violence. Millard suggests states’ use of corporate entities ‘makes it 
quicker, more efficient, easier and clinically more appealing to 
governments than hiring individual contractors’.
32
 The concern in this 
article is not the individual liability of PMSC employees, but rather the 
liability of the juridical entity itself. When it comes to the challenge of 
corporate liability as opposed to individual liability, progress is slow.  
                                                          
29
 See, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, 55
th
 sess, UN Doc No E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (26 August 
2013). Business was strongly opposed to the 2003 Draft Norms. See further, Pini Pavel 
Miretski and Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, 'The UN ‘Norms On The Responsibility Of 
Transnational Corporations And Other Business Enterprises With Regard To Human 
Rights’: A Requiem' (2012) 17(1) Deakin Law Review 5. 
30
 UN Office of The High Commissioner For Human, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (United Nations, 2011)  
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf>. 
31
 Human Rights Council, ‘Draft Resolution - Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working 
Group to Consider the  Possibility of Elaborating an International Regulatory Framework  
on the Regulation, Monitoring and Oversight of the Activities of  Private Military and 
Security Companies’, 22nd sess, UN Doc A/HRC/22/L.29 (18 March 2013). 
32
 Todd S Millard, 'Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate 
Private Military Companies' (2003) 176 Military Law Review 1, 1.  
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The focus in this article, as outlined by Part I, is on PMSCs as corporate 
juridical entities. It assesses the effectiveness of enforcement of 
international obligations through operationalization and implementation 
of state responsibility for wrongful acts of corporate entities and 
accountability through state action in enforcement at the national level. 
The Blackwater Nisor Square incident of 2007 is used as a focal reference 
in Part II. Part III discusses the existing State responsibility for PMSCs as 
contained in the DARS, which provides a starting point for considering 
how responsibility can occur through the classic state system and its 
effectiveness given that primary obligations applicable to PMSCs as legal 
entities are mostly non-existent. Part IV concludes that enforcement of 
international obligations in regards to PMSCs activities is not assured, 
with more creative thought requiring acknowledgment of the 
fundamentally different ideological views at play.  
II THE BLACKWATER SCENARIO 
Blackwater Corporation was a US registered corporation based in 
Moyock, North Carolina, contracted in 2007 to the US State Department 
to provide security in Baghdad, Iraq. Blackwater has since transformed in 
name and ownership and currently operates as Academi.
33
 The CEO of 
Blackwater, Erik Prince, is no longer associated with Academi. The 
former US Attorney General, John Ashcroft, is now an advisor to the 
company.
34
 The infamous Nisor square incident on 16 September 2007 
involved Blackwater employees killing Iraqi civilians.  
Blackwater was contracted to provide personal security to US diplomats, 
an activity acknowledged as acceptable under the Montreux Document.
35
 
In 2007, one of Blackwater’s Tactical Support Teams received a call for 
assistance. They travelled to a roundabout in a convoy of four heavily-
armoured trucks
 
carrying weaponry ranging from sniper and assault rifles 
to machine guns and destructive devices including grenade launchers. 
                                                          
33
 Jason Ukman, 'Ex-Blackwater Firm gets a Name Change, Again', The Washinton Post 
(Washington, DC), 12 December 2011. Initially Forte Capital Advisors and Manhattan 
Partners acquired the corporation in December 2010 transforming it into Xe Services LLC 
providing protective security services. 
34
 See, Jeremy Scahill, 'A Very Private War’ Guardian (London), 1 August 2007: ‘The 
man behind this empire is 38-year-old Erik Prince, a secretive, conservative Christian who 
once served with the US Navy's special forces and has made major campaign contributions 
to President Bush and his allies. Among Blackwater’s senior executives are J Cofer Black, 
former head of counterterrorism at the CIA; Robert Richer, former deputy director of 
operations at the CIA; Joseph Schmitz, former Pentagon inspector general; and an 
impressive array of other retired military and intelligence officials…Blackwater executives 
boast that some of their work for the government is so sensitive that the company cannot 
tell one federal agency what it is doing for another’ [17]; Suzanne Simons, Master of War: 
Blackwater USA's Erik Prince and the Business of War (Harper Perennial, 2010). 
35
 Montreux Document, above n 9, Part VI, 23. 
The defendants opened fire on unarmed civilians, including a traffic 
policeman at the scene.
36
 At least fourteen civilians (not insurgents) were 
killed and another twenty wounded.
37
 The Blackwater defendants claimed 
they acted in self-defence. Their contract agreement was to provide 
defence and their rules of engagement according to their signed 
employment contract stated in part: 
The touchstone of the Embassy Baghdad policy regarding the use of 
deadly force is necessity. The use of deadly force must be objectively 
reasonable under all the circumstances known to the individual at the time 
. . . The necessity to use deadly force arises when all other available 
means of preventing imminent and grave danger to a specific individual 
or other person have failed or would be likely to fail. Thus, employing 
deadly force is permissible when there is no safe alternative to using such 
force and without the use of deadly force, the individual or others would 
face imminent and grave danger. The Mission Firearms Policy also 
recognises that the reasonableness of a belief or decision must be viewed 
from the perspective of the individual on the scene, who may often be 
forced to make split second decisions.
38
 
The State Department internal investigators and FBI investigators took 
over a year to gather the evidence.
39
 The territorial state, Iraq, was keen 
to sanction the company and exclude all PMSCs operating in Iraq.
40
 
However, due to the Coalition Provisional (CPA) Order 17 providing an 
immunity agreement between Iraq and the US for PMSCs this was not 
possible. Iraq requested the US Government end its contract with 
Blackwater and that Blackwater pay compensation to the victims’ 
families. The US has not incurred any responsibility for wrongful action 
in relation to any obligations regarding the incident. Iraqi victims and the 
victims’ families have brought a number of private civil claims 
domestically in the US, against Blackwater under the unique Alien Tort 
                                                          
36
 United States v Ridgeway, Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea (2008) [8]–[11] 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/us-v-ridgeway.pdf>. 
37
 United States of America v Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (DC Cir, 2009); United 
States of America v Slough, 679 F. Supp. 2d 55, ‘Government’s Omnibus Response To 
Defendants’ Motions For Immediate Pre-Trial Release’, 4 (DC Cir, 2010). 
38
 United States v Ridgeway, Factual Proffer in Support of Guilty Plea (2008) [6] 
<http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/us-v-ridgeway.pdf> (emphasis added). 
39
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'FBI Investigating Alleged Blackwater Shooting in Iraq' 
(2 October 2007) FBI National Press Office <http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-
releases/fbi-investigating-alleged-blackwater-shooting-in-iraq>. 
40
 'Blackwater: We Will Leave Iraq if US Orders It', International Herald Tribune (Paris), 
30 January 2009: ‘Blackwater has been operating in Iraq without a formal license since 
2006. The State Department extended Blackwater’s contract for a year last spring, despite 
widespread calls for it to be expelled because of the shootings’; See, Michael S Schmidt 
and Eric Schmidt, 'Flexing Muscle, Baghdad Detains US Contractors’, New York Times 
(New York), 15 January 2012, [17]. 
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Statute (‘ATS’).
41
 Blackwater, some five years later has settled the 
lawsuits for an undisclosed sum, leaving an uncertain outcome on where 
legal liability lay.
42
  
Unrelated to the Nisor Square killings, the US government initiated 
criminal proceedings against Blackwater and its transformed companies, 
XE and Academi. These included charges for violations of the Arms 
Export Control Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. These matters 
settled in 2012 with a non-prosecution agreement between Academi and 
the Departments of Justice and State. The company admitted facts 
outlined in a bill of information and undertook to pay a $7.5 million fine 
and a $42 million settlement.
43
 
In confirming the agreement, US District Court Judge Flanagan noted 
that:  
[f]or an extended period of time, Academi/Blackwater operated in a 
manner which demonstrated systemic disregard for US government laws 
and regulations [and it] should serve as a warning to others that 
allegations of wrongdoing will be aggressively investigated.
44
   
Such a statement suggests that a PMSC may well be accused of operating 
a corporate criminal culture.
45
 Nevertheless, the deferred prosecution 
agreement enables Academi to resolve matters based on the conditions 
contained in the contract with the government. These efforts are 
monitored during a period of supervision. None of this deals with any 
criminal action against Blackwater, the corporation, in relation to the 
PMSC activity in the Nisor Square killings or attribution to the US state 
for wrongful actions of Blackwater. 
Despite the US Congress having been assured that PMSCs could be held 
legally accountable, the incident demonstrates the US was inadequately 
prepared. Various legislative changes were required, including changes in 
                                                          
41
 Judiciary Act, ch 20, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). This Act was reactivated in the 1980’s with 
over 200 court actions having arisen. Five cases against Blackwater were consolidated In 
Re Xe Services Alien Tort Litigation 665 F Supp. 2d 569 (ED Va, 2009) dealing with 64 
plaintiffs, Defendant’s included 11 business entities collectively referred to as XE and the 
CEO Eric Prince. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 'Academi/Blackwater Charged and Enters Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement' (7 August 2012) <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-
releases/2012/academi-blackwater-charged-and-enters-deferred-prosecution-agreement>. 
44
 Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (DC Cir, 2009).  
45
 See further, Megan Donaldson and Rupert Watters, ''Corporate Culture' As A Basis For 
The Criminal Liability Of Corporations', Report for UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Human Rights and Business (2008) <http://198.170.85.29/Allens-
Arthur-Robinson-Corporate-Culture-paper-for-Ruggie-Feb-2008.pdf>. 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (‘UCMJ’)
46
 and the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (‘MEJA’), in order to address loopholes 
in legal coverage.
47
 Criminal charges were finally brought in December 
2008 against five individual Blackwater employees, in US courts.
48
 
United States v Slough (‘Slough’)
49
 is yet to result in any criminal 
conviction of the individuals accused. Four employees are charged jointly 
with thirty-five counts including voluntary manslaughter; attempt to 
commit manslaughter; and using and discharging a firearm during and in 
relation to a crime of violence.
50
  
The outcome of the criminal prosecution has been made difficult by 
evidentiary hurdles created by investigative failures. Statements taken 
from nineteen Blackwater employees at the time by the State Department 
offered immunity from loss of employment and prosecution.
51
 Initially a 
single judge of the District Court, Urbina J, dismissed the charges based 
on the US Constitution’s Fifth Amendment safeguards against self-
incrimination.
52
 However, the Government appealed the decision, and in 
2011 in Slough,
53
 the US Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the 
                                                          
46
 10 USC Sec 80, Article 2(a)(10). The Act inserting this amendment to the UCMJ was the 
The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (P.L. 109–364) 
s 552; See, Memorandum from Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, UCMJ Jurisdiction 
over DoD Civilian Employees, DoD Contractor Personnel, and Other Persons Serving 
with or Accompanying the Armed Forces Overseas During Declared and in Contingency 
Operations (10 March 2008) <www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/gates-ucmj.pdf>. 
47
 18 USC §§ 3261; Stephanie N Kang, 'Private Security Companies: A Lack of 
Accountability' (2004)  The UCI Undergraduate Research Journal 35, 41: ‘Although 
Blackwater employees were implicated for the Nisor Square shootings, the Patriot Act, the 
MEJA, and the UCMJ all failed to provide effective accountability measures to convict 
security contractors involved in the shootings’; Glenn R Schmitt, 'Amending the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000: Rushing to Close an Unforeseen Loophole' [2005] 
(6) The Army Lawyer 41. 
48
 Eugene Robinson, ‘A Whitewash for Blackwater?’ Washington Post (Washington, DC), 
9 December 2008: ‘Prosecutors did not file charges against the North Carolina-based 
Blackwater firm …or any of the company's executives. The whole tragic incident is being 
blamed on the guards’. 
49
 Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (DC Cir  2009); United States of America v Slough, 679 F. 
Supp. 2d 55 (DC Cir, 2010). 
50
 Slough, 677 F. Supp. 2d 112 (DC Cir 2009); United States v Ridgeway, Factual Proffer 
in Support of Guilty Plea (2008) [8]–[11] <http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/us-v-
ridgeway.pdf>. 
51
 Ibid;  The Justice Department  dismissed charges against the defendant, Nick Slatten, 
conceding that key testimony relied on his compelled statement. See further, James Vicini, 
'US Court Dismisses Iraqi Contractor Torture Case’ Reuters (online), 11 September 2009 
<http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKTRE58A4QT20090911?ca=rdt>. 
52
 Guy Adams, 'Iraq outraged as Blackwater case is Dropped', The Independent (London), 2 
January 2010. 
53
 United States of America v Slough (DC Cir, No 10-3006, 22 April 2011). See Mike 
Scarcella, 'Appeals Court Reinstates Blackwater Manslaughter Case in D.C.’ on The BLT: 
The blog of Legal Times (22 April 2011) 
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District Court decision and the US Supreme Court supported this.
54
 
Slough demonstrates the obstacles the US, as one of the largest state users 
of PMSCs, had domestically in adequately investigating and enforcing 
sanctions against the individual perpetrators of serious crimes. Holding 
the corporation accountable for the employee’s actions or its own conduct 
is even more vexed.  
What is clear from the Blackwater event is that the US, as one of the 
recent users of PMSCs in fragile and conflicted environments, was not in 
a position to address satisfactorily criminal actions of PMSCs. This raises 
the question of the responsibility of states under international law for 
PMSCs actions. 
III WHAT RESPONSIBILITIES DO STATES HAVE FOR PMSCS? 
Considering the position of PMSC employees separate from the juridical 
entity itself demonstrates the difficulty in dealing with these individuals. 
Although a grey area, individual PMSC employees are generally not 
considered part of a military chain of command, and as such, may avoid 
obligations under the Geneva Conventions.
55
 Employees of PMSCs are 
subject to the terms of their employment contract, which is usually 
governed by the law of the contracting state, and possibly the law of the 
territorial state, unless an indemnity operates.
56
 The Coalition 
Provisional Authority Order No. 17 (‘CPA Order 17’) resulted in 
Blackwater employee’s in the Nisor Square incident being exempt from 
the application of the territorial state’s criminal law. The practice of 
obtaining immunity from territorial state law only exacerbates 
accountability issues.
57
 The US refusal to participate in the International 
                                                                                                                             
<http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/04/appeals-court-reinstates-blackwater-
manslaughter-case-in-dc.html>. 
54
 See Ryan Devereaux, 'Blackwater Guards lose bid to appeal charges in Iraqi Civilian 
Shooting Case', The Guardian (London), 5 June 2012. 
55
 See, eg, United States of America v Ali, 71 MJ 256 (CAAF, 2012). See further, Kristen 
McCallion, 'War for Sale! Battlefield Contractors in Latin American & the 
‘Corporatization’ of America’s War on Drugs' (2005) 36(2/3) University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review 317, 328 arguing PMSCs are ‘private extension[s] of the US 
military’. 
56
 See National Authorities of Iraq, ‘Status of the Coalition Provisional Authority, MNF – 
Iraq, Certain Missions and Personnel in Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 
17, revised 27 June 2004 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997ada3.html> (‘CPA Order 
17’). 
57
 Ian Traynor, 'The Privatization of War: $30 Billion Goes to Private Military, Fears Over 
'Hired Guns' Policy', Guardian (London), 10 Dec 2003 [34]: Dyncorp was given the 
contract to train the Bosnian police force. ‘However a number of its employees were 
implicated in a sex slave scandal, with girls as young as 12 years old, for which the 
employees allegedly were dismissed but were never prosecuted and with no apparent 
adverse repercussions for the company, who have trained the Haitian police, and Afghan 
police.’; Australian police served in Papua New Guinea under the Joint Agreement on 
 
Criminal Court (‘ICC’) by actively enlisting states to sign ‘Article 98 
agreements’ prohibiting the surrendering of US war crime suspects also 
does not bode well for state responsibility for the upholding of  ICL, IHL 
and IHRL obligations in regard to non-state actors where the US is 
involved.
58
 
The reality presents a number of considerations that may undermine the 
incentives for states to regulate PMSCs. These include the drive by 
incorporating home states to avoid placing extra regulatory burdens on 
corporations, as this has direct implications for the tax revenue of the 
state.
59
 Aligned with this, territorial states are often weak states, with 
poor regulatory and financial controls, keen to attract investment. Hence, 
they may be tempted to maintain low standards. By minimising human 
rights commitments, a race to the bottom occurs.
60
 Other considerations 
for contracting states include being able to conduct covert foreign policy, 
force enlargement, and a desire not to dissuade future commitment by 
PMSCs to the state’s activities.
61
 
Despite this, some international lawyers claim the existing law can cover 
PMSC employees.
62
 However, there is debate and disagreement, making 
the probability of actually holding PMSC employees accountable unlikely 
in practice.
63
 The difficulties experts have with the responsibility to 
comply with ICL, IHL and IHRL as regards PMSC employees does not 
bode well for successful law enforcement. However, if these issues can be 
answered satisfactorily, it may then be possible that at least PMSC 
employee’s actions can be dealt with via criminal sanctions or even 
military discipline laws that implement the Geneva Conventions at the 
state level.  
                                                                                                                             
Enhanced Cooperation between Papua New Guinea and Australia, signed 30 June 2004, 
[2004] ATS 24 (entered into force 13 August 2004) in which Australia sought immunity 
for its own government agency.  This agreement was held to breach the Papua New Guinea 
Constitution in Supreme Court Reference No 3 of 2011 [2012] 4 Law Reports of the 
Commonwealth 490 (Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea).  
58
 Carl Bloggs, ‘Outlaw Nation: the Legacy of US War Crimes’ in Carl Bloggs (ed) 
Masters of War. Militarism and Blowback in the Era of American Empire (Psychology 
Press, 2003) 191, 194. See also, Butch Bracknell, 'The US and the International Criminal 
Court: An unfinished debate', Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles), 26 May 2011. 
59
 Carlos  M. Vázquez, 'Direct vs. Indirect Obligations of Corporations Under International 
Law' (2005) 43(3) Columbia Journal Of Transnational Law 927. 
60
 See Surya Deva, 'Acting Extraterritorially to Tame Multinational Corporations for 
Human Rights Violations: Who Should “Bell the Cat”?' (2004) 5(1) Melbourne Journal of 
Internaional Law 37.  
61
 See, eg, Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher (eds), Private Security, Public Order. 
The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
62
 See Expert Meeting, above n 25, 64. 
63
 Ibid. 
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However, this does not address the liability of the juridical person, the 
PMSC. If criminal and other sanctions against individuals have minimal 
prospect of success, it is likely to be even more difficult with PMSCs. 
The DARS provide a starting point for considering the difficulties with 
state responsibility as a solution, as they establish the terms on which 
state obligations internationally may arise for the activities of PMSCs. It 
is important to keep in mind in this discussion that the DARS, while in 
places providing progressive development, are generally only 
representative of customary international law and provide no more than a 
reference for jurists and the possibility of further development of 
international law.
64
 The controversy and difficulty in finalising the DARS 
meant compromise was the reality, as the international regime requires 
state agreement.
65
  
Liability for wrongful action first requires the existence of primary 
international obligations to be clearly established. Once such an 
obligation exists, the secondary rules of attribution as developed in the 
DARS can attach a legal regime for enforcement. Articles 4, 5, 8 and 9 are 
the key articles of the DARS which provide the secondary rules by which 
NSA actions can be attributed to states such that the state might incur 
responsibility for the wrong. The question of state responsibility will arise 
for any actions of the state’s ‘armed forces’, as an organ of the state under 
DARS article 4, or as exercising government functions under DARS article 
5.
66
 Further, DARS article 8 can come into effect if the PMSC is 
operating under the direction or control, or on the instructions of the state, 
irrespective of the nature of the function performed.
67
 Key difficulties 
include, whether PMSCs are part of the armed forces, and what state 
authorisation they have, or indeed what degree of state control over their 
actions is evident. What is required to satisfy direction, control, or 
instructions is open to interpretation and therefore remains uncertain as a 
discussion of each of the relevant DARS provisions now demonstrates.  
A Article 4: Conduct of Organs of a State 
Article 4 of the DARS provides the starting point for a well-recognised 
principle by which States are held responsible for the conduct of any state 
organ.
68
 Organ includes ‘person or entity’.
69
 The military is such an 
                                                          
64
 See, eg, Bodansky and Crook, above n 3; Andrea Gattini, ‘Smoking/No Smoking: Some 
Remarks on the Current Place of Fault in the ILC Draft Artciles of State Responsibility’ 
(1999) 10(2) European Journal of Internaional  Law 397. 
65
 See, eg, Edith Brown Weiss, 'Invoking State Responsibility In The Twenty-First 
Century' (2002) 96(4) The American Journal Of International Law 798. 
66
 Expert Meeting, above n 25, 5: ‘…it was the considered opinion of the experts that not 
all duties on states under the Geneva Convention (GC) would require the operation of 
governmental authority in accordance with the DARS.’ 
67
 Ibid 6. 
68
 See, eg, Claims of Italian Nationals Resident in Peru (1901) RIAA vol XV 395 at 399. 
organ as is an individual if deemed by the internal domestic law to be part 
of the military. An entity, which holds a separate legal personality such as 
a PMSC, is not generally considered an organ of the State,
70
 unless the 
State was, for instance:  
[t]o formally incorporate a PMSC into its armed forces by adopting 
domestic legislation which places the PMSC under the command of the 
State’s armed forces. Where a State incorporates paramilitary or law 
enforcement agencies into its armed forces, the State is required under 
Article 43(3) [Additional Protocol 1] to notify the other parties to the 
conflict that it has done so.
71
  
Although some argue PMSCs are an extension of the military,
72
 an 
important consideration often not addressed is the purpose of PMSCs. If 
they are to become part of the State’s armed forces, then why are they not 
just, the State’s military, but instead PMSCs?
73
 As noted above in Pt III 
States have reasons for outsourcing to PMSCs and these benefits may be 
lost if PMSCs effectively just become part of a State’s armed forces.
74
 It 
is not satisfactory that a state can choose to label PMSCs, as its ‘armed 
forces’ for certain purposes and then not for others, as it suits the state.  
However, United States v Ali (‘Ali’)
75
 established such a connection, in 
order to confirm court-martial jurisdiction over an independent contractor 
working for a US corporation. The majority in the Court of Appeal for the 
Armed Forces (‘CAAF’), accepted Ali, a dual Iraqi-Canadian national 
employed by L-3 Corp as an interpreter, was an integral part of the war 
fighting effort, and within the definition of ‘land and naval forces’ for the 
purposes of court-martial discipline. Although the Court did not accept 
that this also extended to Ali an entitlement to the Bill of Rights’ 
                                                                                                                             
69
 DARS art 4(2). 
70
 Oil Fields of Texas v Iran (1982) 9 Iran-US CTR 347; Phillips Petroleum v Iran (1989) 
21 Iran-USCTR 79; Petrolane v Iran (1991) 27 Iran-USCTR 64 [21]. See also, Expert 
Meeting, above n 25, 9–12. 
71
 Expert Meeting, above n 25, ‘While the experts disagreed as to exactly what a State 
would need to do in order to comply with the ‘command’ and ‘disciplinary system’ 
requirements of Article 43(1) AP I and the possible ‘incorporation’ requirement of Article 
43(3) AP I , all ultimately agreed that a PMSC could qualify as a State’s armed forces 
under Article 43(1) AP I,  and its members qualify as combatants under Article 43(2) AP I,  
if these requirements were fulfilled.’ 12; Also note Article 13 GC I and Article 4 GC III; 
See further, Ottavio Quirico, 'War Contexts: The Criminal Responsibility of Private 
Security Personnel' (European University Institute Working Papers, No AEL 2010/3, 
Academy of European Law, 2010).  
72
 See McCallion, above n 55. 
73
 Expert Meeting, above n 25, 11: ‘… currently, PMCs do not lie within the military chain 
of command. The current US field Manual, for example, specifies that all contractors are 
outside the military chain of command’. 
74
 See, eg, Deva, above n 60. 
75
 71 MJ 256 (CAAF, 2012).  
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protections,
76
 the CAAF decision leaves open wider questions of whether 
Ali could then also be classified as a State agent for the purposes of 
attracting State responsibility. 
The next hurdle in article 4 is determining whether the NSA behaviour 
breaches an international obligation. Blackwater was contracted to 
provide defensive protection detail to government officials and in the 
process committed criminal offences. While this is not the same as 
government providing backing to militia groups engaged in international 
crimes, such as in the Genocide Judgment,
77
 even this case demonstrates 
the difficulty in attributing actions of entities or organs to the state.  The 
Genocide Judgment considered whether alleged acts of genocide 
committed by paramilitary and militia groups during the Serbia and 
Montenegro conflict with Bosnia and Herzegovinian in 1992 were 
breaches of the Genocide Convention
78
 attributable to the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. The ICJ did not find the hurdle required by 
article 4 an easy one. The Court found difficulty not only in determining 
the exact nature of the state’s obligations under the Genocide Convention 
but also set a very high standard before NSA actions could be attributed 
to the state. What actions can amount to genocide was strictly interpreted 
and applied, with only one of the several notorious massacres occurring 
in the Bosnian and Serbian conflict qualifying.
79
  
In considering attribution based on DARS article 4, ‘conduct of organs’,
80
 
the ICJ stated there was nothing which could justify a conclusion the acts 
committed by the NSAs (the Republika Srpska, VRS and the paramilitary 
militia known as the ‘Scorpions’) were acts perpetrated by ‘persons or 
entities’ enjoying the status of organs of the state of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (‘FRY’).
81
 The ICJ reinforced the strict test of ‘complete 
dependence’ that was set forth in its 1986 Judgment in Nicaragua v 
United States of America
82
 noting the high standard imposed in that 
decision before State responsibility was activated: 
                                                          
76
 Ibid. 
77
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 
43. (‘Genocide Judgment’). 
78
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for 
signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951) 
(‘Genocide Convention’).  
79
 Genocide Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 43 [297], [376]. 
80
 Ibid [385]. 
81
 Ibid [386]: ‘…the Republika Srpska, nor the VRS were de jure organs of the FRY, since 
none of them had the status of organ of that State under its internal law.’ 
82
 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua’).  
…persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international 
responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not 
follow from internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or 
entities act in ‘complete dependence’ on the State, of which they are 
ultimately merely the instrument.
83
  
To suggest Blackwater was a corporate entity completely dependent on, 
or an instrument of, the US is too great a stretch. If the PMSC is not a 
state organ within article 4 then the next level of attribution possible is 
found in article 5 where the test is also set at a high level before a state 
can be held responsible. 
B Article 5: Conduct of Persons or Entities Exercising Elements of 
Governmental Authority 
Article 5 covers non-organs of State, which are nevertheless empowered 
by State law to exercise governmental authority in regard to the particular 
act in question. This extends to entities such as corporations. However, 
the term ‘exercise elements of governmental authority’ is open to 
interpretation. No list defining what constitutes ‘governmental authority’ 
exists.
84
 As governments engage in outsourcing government functions, 
resorting to an accepted understanding of what is ‘governmental’ may 
become more difficult.
85
 Government functions also vary between states 
based on cultural and historical differences. This means certainty 
regarding responsibility for conduct cannot be assured prior to 
undertaking the conduct.  
However, certain core activities such as policing, and military combat are 
generally considered matters of government authority.
86
 Support 
activities often now outsourced to PMSCs, such as interpretation, laundry 
and food preparation services may be more problematic. Some argue that 
where a primary international obligation requires a particular function 
occur, it justifies it being categorised as a government function.
87
 Other 
experts, however, suggest this would be too wide, as not all Geneva 
Convention requirements, for instance, are considered an exercise of 
government authority.
88
  
                                                          
83
 Genocide Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 43 [391]–[393] (emphasis added). 
84
 See, White above n 18, 135. The Draft Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and 
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85
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The second requirement of article 5 is that the authority must be 
‘empowered by the law of the State’. This is open to narrow 
interpretation, requiring a specific law to be passed or more generally, 
encompassing government powers to delegate. The latter view is 
preferred given Crawford’s commentary that the ‘usual and obvious’ 
empowerment is through ‘delegation or authorization by or under a law of 
the state’.
89
 As such, a contract between a government authority and a 
PMSC may be sufficient in regard to the second criteria.  
Experts agree that this is the most likely article to attract state 
responsibility for PMSC actions.
90
  Blackwater was providing security 
for diplomats in a foreign state in which there was ongoing conflict.  
However, whether policing and security functions can be considered an 
exercise of government authority any longer is difficult to discern, as 
PMSCs become the accepted norm. Whether the state could be held 
responsible is dependent on the answer to this question.  
An important difference to note for article 5 attribution is that strict 
liability applies to actions of an entity whose conduct is attributable under 
the article, including actions beyond its authority. This is not the case 
with article 8, where activity beyond instructions, or outside the control 
and direction of the state, cannot be attributed to the state.
91
 However, 
where proof of carrying out governmental authority is difficult to 
establish, resort to article 8 may provide an alternative. 
C Article 8: Conduct Directed or Controlled by a State 
Where a NSA does not qualify as an organ of the State, because it 
operates with some independence it may still be said to be acting on the 
instructions of the State or under State direction or control.
92
 Ambiguity 
is presented by the words ‘the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of’ in article 8. The Commentary to the article provides some 
clarification, stating: 
[m]ost commonly cases of this kind will arise where State organs 
supplement their own action by recruiting or instigating private persons or 
groups who act as ‘auxiliaries’ while remaining outside the official 
structure of the State. These include, for example, individuals or groups of 
private individuals who, though not specially commissioned by that State 
                                                          
89
 James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, First Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/490/Add.6 (24 July 1998) 154. 
90
  Expert Meeting, above n 25, 18. 
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 See DARS art 7. But cf Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999) [121] 
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 See, DARS art 8; Genocide Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 43 [397]–[398]. 
and not forming part of its police or armed forces, are employed as 
auxiliaries or are sent as ‘volunteers’ to neighbouring countries, or are 
instructed to carry out particular missions abroad.
93
 
Instructions may be found in the contract for services and Rules of 
Engagement specified by the government agency instructing the PMSC. 
However, the test is narrow, demanding specific instructions to commit 
the actual wrong.  In the Genocide Judgment, the ICJ, having ruled out 
attribution under DARS article 4 based on the heightened requirement of 
‘total dependence’ of NSAs on the respondent State, then considered 
whether state responsibility could apply under DARS article 8. The ICJ 
adopted the test established in Nicaragua concerning the actions of the 
Contras, which again placed the requirement at a high level: 
[i]n this context it is not necessary to show that the persons who 
performed the acts alleged to have violated international law were in 
general in a relationship of ‘complete dependence’ on the respondent 
State; it has to be proved that they acted in accordance with that State’s 
instructions or under its ‘effective control’. It must however be shown that 
this ‘effective control’ was exercised, or that the State’s instructions were 
given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations 
occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the 
persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.
94
 
 The ICJ applied the Nicaragua standard of ‘effective control’ in the 
Genocide Judgment stating: 
The rules for attributing alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a 
State do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in question in the 
absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis. Genocide will be considered 
as attributable to a State if and to the extent that the physical acts 
constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs or persons 
other than the State’s own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on 
the instructions or directions of the State, or under its effective control.
95
 
The Genocide Judgment took 14 years before final determination, 
showing that establishing State responsibility for NSA actions is almost 
                                                          
93
 International Law Commission, ‘Commentaries to Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, Report of International Law Commission on the 
work of its Fifty-Third Session, UN GAOR, 56
th
 sess, UN Doc A/56/10 (24 October 2001), 
104.  
94
 Genocide Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 43 [400] (emphasis added); Tadić (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 
July 1999) [115], citing Nicaragua: ‘The Court went so far as to state that in order to 
establish that the United States was responsible … it was necessary to prove that the 
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 Genocide Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 43 [401]. See Tadić (International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999) [109], 
[112]. 
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insurmountable. Despite the close ties and funding by the FRY, evidence 
of specific involvement by the State in the specified conduct was required 
and, in circumstances of conflict, found nearly impossible to establish. 
Certainly, a State using PMSCs distances itself in a way that places this 
hurdle between the State and any responsibility for NSA actions, even if 
the State benefits from these actions. The ICJ justified limiting the control 
required for the application of article 8 to ‘specific instructions, control, 
or direction’ as to do otherwise, the Court decided, would considerably 
and unreasonably expand the responsibility of States.
96
 For this reason, 
the ICJ rejected the ICTY Appeal Chamber’s lesser standard of ‘overall 
control’, provided in Tadić.
 97
 
The Genocide Judgment is not without critics.
98
 The strong dissenting 
judgments alone raise some important considerations.
99
 Vice President 
Al-Khasawnch, in dissent, argued: 
the Court’s rejection of the standard in the Tadic case fails to address the 
crucial issues raised therein - namely that different types of activities, 
particularly in the ever evolving nature of armed conflict, may call for 
subtle variations in the rules of attribution. … When, however, the shared 
objective is the commission of international crimes, to require both 
control over the non-State actors and the specific operations in the context 
of which international crimes were committed is too high a threshold. The 
inherent danger in such an approach is that it gives States the opportunity 
to carry out criminal policies through non-state actors or surrogates 
without incurring direct responsibility therefore… 
100
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 Tadić (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, 
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100
 Genocide Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 43 (Vice-President Al-Khasawneh). See also, 
‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia (2005) Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C) 134, [123]: ‘The Court 
determined, that the actions of the paramilitary group engaged Colombia's international 
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Given the ICJ Genocide Judgment, any likelihood of Blackwater’s 
actions in Nisor Square being attributable to the US under article 8 DARS 
is just not possible.
101
  
The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić
102
 did not find the Nicaragua test 
persuasive, instead developing a less onerous standard for article 8.
103
 
Referring to article 8 DARS the Chamber stated:  
[s]tates are not allowed on the one hand to act de facto through 
individuals and on the other to disassociate themselves from such conduct 
when these individuals breach international law. The requirement of 
international law for the attribution to States of acts performed by private 
individuals is that the State exercises control over the individuals. The 
degree of control may, however, vary according to the factual 
circumstances of each case. The Appeals Chamber fails to see why in 
each and every circumstance international law should require a high 
threshold for the test of control. Rather, various situations may be 
distinguished.
104
 
The Appeals Chamber was set the task to consider: 
the conditions under which armed forces fighting against the central 
authorities of the same State in which they live and operate may be 
deemed to act on behalf of another State. In other words, the Appeals 
Chamber will identify the conditions under which those forces may be 
assimilated to organs of a State other than that on whose territory they live 
and operate.
105
 
The impact of the determination of this question was that a State could 
ultimately be held responsible for the activities of the NSA if the conflict 
was determined to be international in nature and a degree of control 
existed, but not at the heightened level required by the ICJ in the 
Genocide Judgment. As IHL was found not to lay down a measure by 
which control could be determined, the Chamber in Tadić looked to the 
general international law of State responsibility.
106
 The judgment 
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contended that the question of control needed in order to find a NSA to be 
a de facto organ of a State were the same whether under IHL or the 
customary international law of State responsibility.
107
 The lesser test 
outlined by Tadić in relation to forces that constitute a ‘military 
organisation’ as the court concluded the Bosnian Serb armed forces were, 
was an ‘overall control’ by State authorities. While this was to go beyond 
mere financing and equipping to include ‘participation in planning and 
supervision of military operations’, it did not require control in the form 
of ‘the issuance of specific orders or instructions relating to single 
military actions, whether or not such actions were contrary to 
international humanitarian law’.
108
  
The Chamber was of the view it could still be possible to regard armed 
groups and private individuals as a de facto organ of the State despite not 
having official State status through internal law. The degree of control 
needed for this varied. If it was a single individual or a non-military 
organised group, then specific instructions for the specific action were 
required from the State to engage its responsibility.
109
 If however, it was 
the action of a subordinate armed force, militias or paramilitary units, 
control need only be overall and no proof of specific instructions was 
required.
110
 
It may be possible to argue that Blackwater was paid for, or financed 
directly by the State, as it was contracted to the State Department to 
provide security to government diplomats, a task commonly assigned to 
the police force or military personnel. However, on the second limb of the 
Genocide test, the connection would fail as Blackwater employees actions 
at Nisor Square could not be shown to be specifically coordinated or 
supervised by the State. However, if the Tadić test of ‘overall control’ 
was considered, perhaps US responsibility for Blackwater’s actions 
would be possible. As a security provider for government officials in a 
conflict zone, the claim may stretch to the US based on overall control. 
However, the State did not have a clear line of command control, a factor 
which provides an ongoing difficulty for the military working in conflict 
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zones alongside PMSCs.
111
 Ultimately, this argument is rendered moot 
by the ICJ’s explicit rejection of the Tadić standard. 
Tadić asserts the realism that the law of State responsibility gives States 
incentive to ensure juridical persons act in a socially responsible 
manner,
112
 in order to avoid any gaps in accountability.
113
 The DARS, 
however, presents legal niceties that provide only a thin measure for 
achieving real outcomes for the consequences of illegal actions by 
PMSCs. Developing a system of secondary rules for international wrongs 
of PMSCs demands more, requiring the idealism referred to by 
Oppenheim,
114
 mixed with the pragmatic realism demanded by power 
politics. This political reality provides lessons to be learned from the 
more than fifty years it took to develop the DARS. Given the controversial 
position of PMSCs, as NSAs, this could indicate an even more fraught 
process in attempting to apply direct international obligations to PMSCs. 
Given the case-by-case nature of determining state responsibility,
115
 it is 
unlikely that creating specific attribution rules for PMSCs would provide 
any greater assurance of coverage. 
D Other Possible Concerns 
Two further areas of concern arise: one, the incentive for PMSCs to 
comply with international law; and two, the access to a remedy and direct 
compensation for victims. First, if victims could rely on state 
responsibility for PMSC actions, the corporate entity still holds no direct 
internationally enforceable accountability for their involvement. As a 
juridical entity, even if they have a corporate criminal culture, they rarely 
face prosecution, even domestically. So what is the incentive for PMSCs 
to comply with IHL or IHRL?  
IHRL may provide a better answer than IHL. Due diligence in IHRL 
requires certain general principles be observed, even where the conduct 
cannot be attributed to the State, such as those set out in the Declaration 
of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
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and the UN Framework ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’.
116
 They impose 
obligations on States regarding enforcement of human rights standards, 
criminal justice and reparation. These obligations include requirements 
regarding information about rights, access to justice, a prompt and 
effective remedy, participation in criminal proceedings, protection against 
retaliation, intimidation, and observance of privacy. States are required to 
ensure that the offender provides restitution and, in the event the offender 
does not, the principles place an onus on the state to set up a 
compensation fund.
117
 In the case of the Nisor Square killings, as noted, 
some victims received an undisclosed settlement as compensation from 
Blackwater because of their private civil suit under the ATS. However, 
the US has not been required to make reparation or compensation to Iraq 
or Iraqi civilians.
118
  
A second concern is, even if there were reparation for wrongs, these are 
between States and often this does not deliver a satisfactory remedy to 
individuals.
119
 The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of IHRL and 
Serious Violations of IHL contain an obligation in Principle IX 
establishing a duty to provide satisfaction, restitution, rehabilitation and 
compensation.
120
 A question then arises whether ‘satisfaction’ can oblige 
a State to ensure corporate criminal sanctions are possible in order for 
victims to see ‘justice’ done. If States are bound to establish a legal 
regime that can hold juridical persons (such as PMSCs) to account, can a 
State be held responsible if they do not succeed in this?  
Reparations from states require a breach of a primary obligation before 
there is responsibility for wrongful actions. State responsibility has not 
provided a resolution in the Blackwater incident. Where armed 
employees of PMSCs are introduced by a State into a conflict area, and 
the PMSC’s actions involve criminal conduct but the wrong cannot be 
                                                          
116
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attributed to the State, it goes unaddressed. PMSCs cannot be directly 
liable for reparation under IHL.
121
  In such situations, the victims of 
PMSCs illegal actions have little recourse to compensation or reparations. 
Thus, relying on retrospective case-by-case determinations of State 
responsibility reinforces uncertainties. Business needs certainty in 
advance to operate profitably. This is a minimum requirement for legal 
order.
122
  
Compensation in the Blackwater event was only available in the shadow 
of the ATS requiring injured aliens to establish federal subject matter 
jurisdiction in the US for a violation of the law of nations. The civil tort 
action enabled the victims to pursue private compensation against the 
corporation.
123
 However, as it stands, actions against corporations under 
the US ATS are in uncertain waters. The seminal case of Kadić v 
Karadžić
124
 in the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on 
international norms as imposing liability on private actors for breach of 
customary international law. This case influenced subsequent ATS 
jurisprudence.
125
 At most, this jurisprudence supports a claim that in the 
US private corporations of any State may be brought before the courts by 
private individuals for civil claims in international torts where these 
involve jus cogens breaches.
126
 However, post Kiobel v Dutch Petroleum 
(‘Kiobel’),
127
  this is more uncertain. Ku points out that the ATS 
jurisprudence prior to Kiobel was based on thin self-referential precedent 
that came to a halt when the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
had to address the question whether private corporations could be liable 
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under international law in Kiobel.
128
 The Court determined there was 
little precedent supporting such a claim for civil liability.   
The unusual ATS legislation of 1789 has presented complex dilemmas 
for US judges looking to respect the domestic separation of powers, a 
federal system and precedent-based case law, yet at the same time 
demanding consideration of international customary law norms requiring 
courts to look beyond the comfort of their jurisdictional border. These 
actions are now becoming limited where corporate activity is concerned, 
and in the specific Blackwater actions did not succeed in a court order but 
resulted in a private settlement. Such a position in which the contracting 
state has agreed to be responsible for oversight of PMSCs really demands 
more certain criteria for redress. It raises the question: has there been a 
wrongful action by the US in failing to deal with the corporations’ 
possible internationally criminal behaviour and if so, should the US be 
held responsible under State responsibility for this?  
The ICJ, in the Genocide Judgment, considered the State’s obligation 
under the Genocide Convention in which Article 1 required ‘the duty to 
prevent genocide and the duty to punish its perpetrators’ The ICJ, seeing 
these as two distinct obligations, found the FRY had not fully met these 
obligations. The Court found the ‘prevent and punishment’ obligation to 
be ‘one of conduct not one of result’, meaning an attempt to prevent 
and/or punish, even though unsuccessful, was enough.
129
 In finding that 
FRY failed to prevent the genocide – making it internationally 
responsible –  the court took account of the information FRY had of ‘the 
climate of deep-seated hatred which reigned between the Bosnian Serbs 
and the Muslims in the Srebrenica region’
130
 and influence through its 
close links with the NSA perpetrators which was reinforced by earlier 
related court orders.
131
 The failure of FRY to cooperate with the ICTY in 
handing over the perpetrators was considered a breach of FRY’s state 
obligations as ‘a Member of the United Nations’.
132
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This raises questions in regard to Blackwater. While the Nisor Square 
incident is not in the nature of a breach of the Genocide Convention, 
which also does not apply to juridical persons, it is conceivable, given the 
nature of the Iraq and Afghan environments, that a potential for attacks on 
civilians by PMSCs could fall within this category. Should this place an 
obligation on the contracting state to maintain greater vigilance and 
oversight of PMSCs it has invited into the conflict zone?  
Morally, given the literature against the use of PMSCs in the Iraq and 
Afghan wars, an affirmative answer could be given to the question.
133
 
However, legalities in enforcing such an obligation create much more 
doubt. It is likely the US with its domestic criminal prosecution in 
Slough
134
 may satisfy State obligations, irrespective of any result.
135
 
However, what of Blackwater, or now Academi, the corporation? Even if 
the US could bring a criminal action against Blackwater in relation to the 
Nisor Square deaths, it is likely that any sanctions would result in the US 
practice of non-prosecuting agreements entered into with corporations as 
they did with the Arms Control Act prosecutions.
136
 This is not likely to 
satisfy the victims. 
In the end, the Iraqi victims remain without criminal redress some seven 
years after the incident. This is unfortunately common. The mass victims 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina and WWII show, through cases such as the 
Genocide Judgment and Germany v Italy
137
 that any victim compensation 
is mostly an aspirational notion with State responsibility, having often 
ambiguous criteria, set at a very high threshold providing a significant 
impediment.
138
 The Genocide Judgment in the end was largely 
unsuccessful in establishing State responsibility for the actions of 
Republika Srpska, and the VRS, with no direct compensation made to 
victims or their families. On the question of reparation, the ICJ in the 
Genocide Judgment found there was not a sufficient causal link with the 
wrongful conduct of the NSAs to justify financial compensation.
139
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States are inherently reluctant to proceed against other States.
140
 In the 
case of Iraq, a State with a newly established political system installed by 
the US, it is unlikely Iraq would hold the US to account and yet, 
reparation is a key aspect of enforcement. However, while individuals 
may have a moral right to compensation or reparation, this is not certain 
legally and whether they have a right to bring an enforceable claim is 
even less clear.
141
 The duty for a state to make reparation for IHL 
violations in international armed conflict is a duty applicable under 
customary international law.
142
 Generally, states pursue reparation from 
other states through a negotiated peace deal,
143
 although State practice 
may challenge this continued presumption.
144
 It would appear States are 
not obliged under IHL to enable claims to be made against PMSCs.
145
 
The problem is that states may, in the end, provide no direct 
compensation to the actual victim of a breach and general compensation 
agreed between States may not reflect the overall claims being made. The 
result is that claims for compensation are left in an unsatisfactory state.  
IV CONCLUSION 
Overall, the response to PMSCs is piecemeal and unsatisfactory. Rather 
than engaging in discussion on the rights and wrongs of PMSCs, the 
ICRC has focused on regulation and the education of IHL in such 
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organisations.
146
 The IWG on PMSCs, tasked with elaborating an 
international regulatory framework for PMSCs had its work extended by 
two years on the 22 March 2013 and is yet to propose a solution.
147
  It 
has noted in its latest report that both the Montreux Document and the 
ICoC do not cover the field adequately and an overarching Convention is 
still required.
148
 
When clear laws regulating accountability fail in their application to the 
military, it does not engender confidence that the legal system will ensure 
PMSCs are accountable.
149
 While some mechanisms may be in place to 
address accountability, there appears to be a lack of will to enforce the 
laws. If the international recognition of the sovereignty of the individual 
at the apex of the project for respect of human rights is not taken 
seriously by states through enforcement of their responsibilities, it will 
likely lead to the state being overtaken in this regard.
150
 Failure to grasp 
the ideological tensions underlying this needs serious attention. Some 
demands for this to be addressed may well come from NSA involvement, 
including from PMSCs. 
This article has addressed the DARS and the obligations of States for 
PMSC actions. The Genocide Judgment, in demonstrating the difficulties 
associated with holding the state accountable for alleged acts of genocide 
by militia, portends the even greater difficulty in holding States 
accountable for any international crimes committed by PMSCs, where 
engaging the services of PMSCs in conflict zones is becoming an 
increasingly ‘accepted’ practice. While the existing law may stretch to 
cover employees of PMSCs (although with its own difficulties) it does 
not adequately deal with the PMSC as a juridical person. Attribution of 
PMSC actions to the State is not currently effective. The international 
community has shown its ability to provide a mechanism for enforcement 
of criminal sanctions against an individual at the ICC. With PMSCs 
potential use of force and ability to engage in actions that can lead to 
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offences considered jus cogens, special control mechanisms are called 
for. Enforcement of international law against NSAs such as PMSCs 
remains an area clearly in need of attention and reform in order to provide 
consistency and certainty in approach. 
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